Messages From Zimbabwe

Zimbabwe’s Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) has called for South Africa’s intervention to help strengthen the country’s fragile accord plagued by power struggles.

The call came amid reports that South African President Jacob Zuma was set to visit the country on Tuesday to assess the state of a power-sharing agreement set up to end a decade-long political and economic crisis.

MDC spokesperson Nelson Chamisa , told News24 that his party hoped Zuma would unlock the deadlock between Zanu-PF and the two MDC formations.

“We’ve just received information through the media reports that President Jacob Zuma is coming and we hope that he will unlock the deadlock. We’ve had a deadlock in the implementation of agreements in the GPA (Global Political Agreement) and we hope that these issues are going to be dealt with and make sure that the government is saved from danger,” Chamisa said.

He said the people of Zimbabwe were tired of the “delaying tactics used by Zanu-PF to buy time so as to de-energise the nation. Unfortunately our guarantors are also becoming victims of these strategies”.

Chamisa said it was unfortunate that Zanu-PF was “falsely” telling the world that sanctions were the problems rattling the country’s government of national unity.

“Let’s implement the agreements in the GPA and the rest will follow. The hope is to be able to enhance the credibility of this government and prepare for non-violent elections,” Chamisa said.

President Zuma is expected to hold a meeting with the three principals in the global political agreement – President Robert Mugabe, Prime Minister Morgan Tsvangirai and Deputy Prime Minister Arthur Mutambara. Reports say that Zuma’s spokesperson Vincent Magwenya, indicated that Zuma will meet the principals individually and as a group.

Zuma’s visit comes a few weeks after his trip to the United Kingdom, where he reportedly called for international support for Zimbabwe’s troubled coalition.

The MDC has already declared a deadlock on all the outstanding GPA issues and wants them referred back to Zuma.

On the other hand, President Mugabe and his Zanu-PF say the talks should be given time, but have also taken a rigid position not to compromise on anything that is against the resolutions of their December 2009 congress.

The South African leader has made it clear that he wants the parties to “park” the contentious issues around key government appointments, sanctions imposed by western countries, and of late, the stripping of powers of MDC ministers.

(Source)

Zimbabwe’s land issue has generated unprecedented debates both within and outside the country. The debates, which followed the dramatic occupations of white farms by rural peasants in the late 1990s, are generally polarised between those who support radical land reform and those who support market-orientated reforms. The former stand accused of supporting Mugabe’s regime while the latter are generally maligned as neo-colonialists running a smear campaign against ZANU PF.

An unfortunate outcome of these polarities has been the trivialisation of the land issue; land occupations have been depicted as simple acts of political gimmickry; landless peasants who occupied these farms have been branded as agents of agrarian and environmental destruction, and are often considered to be in service to the ‘evil’ regime of Robert Mugabe. Some academics have even gone as far as branding the whole process of land occupations, and the violence associated with it, as an apocalyptic end of modernity.

In academia, supporters of radical land reform are generally in the minority; this has made it extremely difficult to challenge the current neo-liberal orthodoxy, which dominates land and agrarian reform policy making in many African countries. The few scholars, who have openly challenged the ‘hostile’ neo-liberal approach to argue for radical land reform, including Sam Moyo, Paris Yeros, and Mamood Mamdani, have often been accused of colluding with Mugabe’s undemocratic regime.

That Mugabe opportunistically used the land issue to boost his political legitimacy is an undeniable fact. Indeed, the country’s collective memory was conveniently manipulated to fit a set political agenda under guise of the ‘Third Chimurenga’ project. However, juxtaposed to Mugabe’s gerrymandering and manipulation of historical memory is a reality that many critics of Mugabe have so far failed to address.

How can one justify the continued existence of a dualistic land ownership structure decades after independence, in a country whose struggle for liberation crystallised around the land issue? How could such an unjust and medieval property ownership structure be permanently sustained in a country where 60 per cent of the population depends on land for their livelihoods?

Another paradox of Zimbabwe’s independence is the extent to which white farmers emerged unscathed by the raging fires of the liberation struggle. Zimbabwe’s negotiated settlement, which led to independence in 1980, left white farmers constitutionally protected. Like Royal game, they held the entire nation at ransom thanks to Lord Carrington, who secured their private property and political rights before handing over a poisoned state to the blacks.

Mugabe’s reconciliatory rhetoric that dominated the early years of independence led to the general belief among White Rhodesians that independence was ‘business as usual’, with many whites continuing to enjoy colonial era privileges and existing in white enclaves. In the so-called ‘new Zimbabwe’, white commercial farmers continued to dominate the commercial farming sector, a key strategic sector given the largely agrarian nature of Zimbabwe’s economy.

This gave them leverage over government policy, which they used to secure their large estates from potential forceful acquisition. Above all, they voted for Ian Smith’s exclusively white Rhodesian Front political party; a mockery of the ideals of a ‘united nation’ propounded by Mugabe’s nationalist administration. On the other hand, the peasantry in remote rural locations continued to eke out a living on degraded patches of barren land, waiting for the ‘promised’ land that was at the core of the liberation struggle.

However, such promises failed to materialise; macro-economic policies favoured landed capitalists and black elites based in cities that generally enjoyed the patronage of senior politicians. A result of the above was that most of the land ‘recovered’ by the government was diverted to ZANU PF loyalists through patronage networks.

Why then do many people decry the land invasions if history shows that peasants were the major losers at independence? Given Zimbabwe’s history, one wonders why white farmers were allowed to sell land back to the government after 1980 instead of helping to contribute to the land reform programme as a form of reparation for the violence and plunder suffered by many Africans during the colonial era. After all, most of the large farms were acquired under unjust and illegal terms.

Justice would have been better served if after securing independence, Mugabe’s government had thrown away the 1979 Lancaster House Constitution in favour of a just constitution based on the country’s historical experiences. Why hang on to a constitution, which promoted the interests of the very people that supported the wanton destruction of African livelihoods, and the merciless bombing of civilians at Nyadzonya, which to this day have never been fully accounted for.

This would have allowed an unfettered land reform programme that was cognisant of our past and righted the wrongful misdeeds of a few. Instead, a dithering elitist government failed to deliver one of the most precious prizes of our independence: The land. For if so many people died at Chimoio, Nyadzonya and in many operational zones, how could their souls rest in peace if independence only resulted in the perpetuation of the status quo? Why could we as a sovereign nation in the interest of morality and justice not say to Britain and other world nations that so many people died for this land, all they want is a fair share of their heritage?’ Is that not a modest demand given our history?

Mugabe’s rhetoric on land should be given serious consideration, however he should also be held accountable for failing to stand up against neo-colonial tactics that led to unnecessary delays in recovering stolen property and for presiding over a patrimonial system which helped to marginalise a large section of the population.

Much of the socialist rhetoric that appears in the country’s Transitional Development Plan (TDP) was never put into practice, instead an ahistorical Land Reform and Resettlement Programme (LRRP) was adopted. This policy was much influenced by Britain and other agents of western capitalism left too much leverage with white farmers who were able to dictate the pace of the land reform programme, and in the process, distort land markets to their advantage.

The result was that the LRRP was too expensive to sustain for a postcolonial government with limited resources. Moreover, those who were ‘chosen’ for resettlement were given land unfavorable to agriculture with limited support in terms of infrastructure and farming inputs. Mugabe’s government, like its colonial predecessor, was reluctant to extend full property rights to the beneficiaries of the LRRP and instead opted to allow resettled farmers to occupy land under insecure permits while at the same time allowing white farmers to continue owning their land on a more secure freehold basis. This perpetuated a system of insecure property rights in communal areas that had been created during the colonial era within the so-called ‘communal tenure’ system.

An analysis of the arguments against radical land reform reveals a chronic failure by both journalists and academics to provide a balanced overview of the Zimbabwean land issue; the causal factors of landlessness steeped in the country’s history are often ignored. There is a tendency to confuse the land issue with Mugabe’s political expediency and in the process the baby is thrown away with the bath water.

The genuine need for land, which is reflected in many rural areas across the country, is simply dismissed as Mugabe’s political posturing. What is often forgotten is that not very long ago millions of Africans were deliberately disenfranchised by a system of state managed repression, segregation and violence. It is these masses that sacrificed their lives and livelihoods to liberate the country and it is these masses that have the moral right to claim back their land. This legitimate need to right the historical wrongs should never be confused with ZANU PF’s attempts to manipulate history for its own selfish interests.

What is also deeply disturbing about those who have argued against land invasions is their total disregard for the views of the poor and marginalised peasants who invaded these farms. On the rare occasions when peasants are featured in short documentaries or academic articles, they are often depicted as barbaric savages attacking white farmers and ruining productive farms.

In contrast, white farmers have generally been given positive media coverage in the west – sentimental testimonials telling stories of loss and ruin, agricultural equipment destroyed and wildlife poached. These stories are often accompanied by graphic images of dead wild animals, especially endangered species like rhinos, elephants etc. This ‘sadistic’ imagery has generated sympathy for white farmers, by portraying them as hard working people, who became victims of Robert Mugabe’s ‘evil regime’.

The plight of many rural farmers who have struggled to survive since the country was liberated decades ago is generally overlooked. They have no one to tell their stories of survival to and local ‘native’ intellectuals, generally far removed from the village, have failed to inform the world about the peasant’s precarious existence: Landlessness, water shortages and disease. What is often suggested in the studies of fly past researchers is the notion that black peasants have an inherent lack of basic environmental knowledge and that they are incapable of feeding themselves.

Across Europe, ignorance about the historical background to Zimbabwe’s land issue among ordinary people runs deep; remarks about how the Zimbabwe government allowed unskilled rural farmers to occupy farms are commonplace. The current food shortages facing the country are simply blamed on incompetent peasants taking over white farms.

It has become fashionable to project Zimbabwe as ‘a bread basket’ before the land invasions and a ‘basket case’ after land invasions. This has helped to support the assumption that without white farmers the country could not feed itself. What is often not mentioned is that the white farmer in Africa is generally an administrator; he does not physically grow crops himself. His black troops produce on his behalf.

However he gets the lion’s share of the profits because he controls the means of production. Moreover, it is easily forgotten that in the early years of colonial occupation in the 1890s, European settlers in Rhodesia survived on grain produced by Africans until The British South Africa Company (BSAC) deliberately destroyed a booming African agriculture in favour of promoting European agriculture after the so called ‘gold rush’ proved to be largely false. Against all odds, Africans have been feeding themselves even during the depression years of the 1930s when the colonial government introduced the Maize Control Act, which helped to distort the grain market in order to protect European farmers.

Apart from the above, there is another argument based on neo-liberal thinking, which says that land reform was supposed to be carried out in an orderly way in order to harness ‘white skills’. This, it is argued, would protect the productive potential of these farms.

The question is why didn’t these white farmers share their skills before the onset of the land invasions? How can one account for the poverty and dislocation of many farm workers who lost their livelihoods once a farmer decided they were no longer needed after many years of hard labour with minimum remuneration?

This argument is also based on a false assumption that black farmers cannot grow crops without white supervision. Most Large Scale Commercial Farms (LSCF) have historically relied on black labour. If LSCF are largely run by black workers who with time have acquired advanced technical skills to operate farm machinery, supervise the large scale growing of commercial crops including tobacco and wheat, why then can blacks fail to do the same for themselves if given the land and the support required to run successful agricultural enterprises?

The image of the black farmer as a permanent subsistence farmer has become part of the official discourse about land and agrarian reform simply because for many decades black farmers have not been given the chance to invest in productive agriculture.

It’s a historical fact that white agricultural success was based on expensive state subsidies, access to cheap labour and extension services, which allowed them to make profits even during the difficult years of economic stagnation. Such services were not accessible to black farmers who had to make do with very little financial and technical support from central government.

While it is true that land invasions did impact on agricultural production; critics of the programme have based their arguments on emotions rather than facts. Since the land invasions took place, no significant longitudinal study based on empirical research has been carried out to justify these arguments. Nobody knows to what extent the land invasions have impacted on agricultural production across the country.

Moreover in trying to access such impacts, one has to take into account climatic factors like recurring droughts, which have historically affected agricultural production. Simplistic arguments biased against the peasantry have led to the trivialisation of an issue that is of paramount importance to Zimbabwe culturally, historically and economically. For land is not only the resource we have in abundance, it’s the only resource that sustains three quarters of the Zimbabwean population.

Given the above, land invasions were inevitable and necessary to ensure peasants ‘got a piece of the cake’. Of course one cannot expect such a radical programme to take place without any form of disruption. While it’s painful in the short term, land invasions have helped a significant number of property-less peasants to not only recover land, but to enjoy a sense of restitution which has a healing effect given the country’s tortured history.

They also helped to break the monopoly of white farmers in commercial agriculture by opening up this key sector to black farmers. Moreover recent research by World Bank economists has proven that large commercial farms are not very productive compared to family operated smallholder farms; they are also a source of political instability as our recent history has demonstrated. Breaking up large commercial farms in favour of more efficient smallholder entities makes economic sense and promotes political stability.

What the Zimbabwean government should do now is to stop dilly-dallying and extend full property rights to peasants settled under the A1 Scheme to provide security and incentives for agricultural investment. It should also offer financial and technical support for those farmers who want to venture into commercial farming. Such a process requires non-partisan support from all those who benefited from land reform. It also requires a mechanism to recover land from those who are hoarding unproductive farms.

This could be achieved through a land audit and a policy restricting farm ownership to a ‘one person one farm’ basis. If the above measures were implemented, Zimbabwe would lead the way as the only country in postcolonial Africa to implement the most radical transfer of property in the 21st century.

It would set an example for Zimbabwe’s neighbours, South Africa and Namibia, which are still slumbering under the stupor of market-driven land reform, with the inevitable risk of political instability as mobs of marginalised peasants are likely to resort to violence to recover land.

(Source)

The International Red Cross has launched an urgent appeal for funding in response to a new hunger crisis in Zimbabwe.

Some 2.8 million Zimbabweans – almost a third of the population – are in need of food aid, and the number is expected to rise as a result of a widespread drought.

Across Masvingo province, in the centre of the country, the parched fields are full of dead or dying maize.

Sky News found a family of four orphans picking through the weeds on their land around their homestead, trying to find something edible.

Ernest Mheti, 17, is caring for his two brothers, aged nine and seven, and his 13-year-old sister.

He was relying on his now-shrivelled crop, planted alongside the mounds of earth that mark the graves of his parents, to provide them with food for the next six months.

Travelling through Masvingo you would be forgiven for thinking that people had already finished harvesting. The fields are empty because the rains failed.

“I cannot sleep at night because I know they are suffering because I cannot find food,” Ernest said.

The Red Cross has set up feeding programmes to try to support the most vulnerable, but a lack of funding means only limited help.

At one of the centres, more than 60 children under the age of five queued up to get their plates filled with a pile of maize meal porridge and beans.

They are all orphans, and the two meals a day they are given at the centre are all they get to eat. Sometimes the money – and the food – runs out.

“When we don’t feed them, they just get water at home,” project co-ordinator Musa Gumbo said.

The Red Cross is facing a shortfall of $23.9m (£15.9m) for its programmes in Zimbabwe, which include home care for those infected by HIV.

Hunger is impacting the efforts to provide anti-retroviral treatment to the sick because the medication has to be taken on a full stomach.

“We have seen people default on their treatment because the drugs are too toxic without food,” Emma Kundishora, secretary general of the Zimbabwe Red Cross, said.

Zimbabwe’s year-old national unity government, led by president Robert Mugabe and his old rival Morgan Tsvangirai, has so far done little to address the widespread poverty that was largely caused by Mugabe’s years of misrule.

(Source)

The Malaysian government on Tuesday protested to Harare over the seizure by a former top army general of a Malaysian-owned banana farm in eastern Zimbabwe. Charge de Affairs at the Kuala Lumpur’s embassy in Harare, Mohamad Nizan Mohamad, told journalists in Harare that Vice President John Nkomo promised to take the matter to President Robert Mugabe – a friend of former Malaysian Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad. “The issue of our existing investments and how they have been affected was raised and the response was positive and encouraging,” Mohamad said after meeting Nkomo yesterday. “We were assured by the Vice President that our matter would be taken to the President.” Retired major general Edzai Chimonyo last January seized the banana farm in Burma Valley in the eastern Manicaland province, claiming he was allocated the property in 2006 under Mugabe’s controversial land reform programme. The banana farm is owned by Matanuska, a farming organisation owned by Malaysian investors and is protected under a bilateral investment promotion and protection agreement (BIPPA) between Harare and Kuala Lumpur.

The Malaysians also own several other agro-business projects in Manicaland and Mashonaland Central provinces that has some of Zimbabwe’s best agricultural land. Mohamad said the Asian investors had made significant investment on the land and were planning to expand operations once the dispute over ownership of the banana farm was resolved. Mugabe’s chaotic and often violent programme to seize white-owned farm land for redistribution to landless blacks also saw several farms owned by foreigners and protected under bilateral trade agreements between Zimbabwe and other countries seized without compensation. The seizure of private land has raised questions about Zimbabwe’s commitment to uphold property rights as well as agreements entered with other countries. But the veteran Zimbabwean leader, who has in the past backed seizure of white-owned land including farms protected under bilateral agreements, will be caught in tight in spot over the Malaysian–owned farm given his perceived close ties to the Kuala Lumpur establishment.

Mugabe has not made secret his clearly improbable wish to turn Zimbabwe into the Malaysia of southern Africa. He has also regularly holidayed in the south east Asian country since the United States and European Union governments banned him and his top allies from their territories as punishment for stealing elections and failure to uphold the rule of law, democracy, human and property rights. Mugabe’s land reforms that he says were necessary to correct a colonial land ownership system that reserved the best land for whites and banished blacks to poor soils, are blamed for plunging Zimbabwe into food shortages after he failed to support black villagers resettled on former white farms with inputs to maintain production. In addition critics say Mugabe’s cronies in his Zanu PF party and the security establishment – and not ordinary peasants – benefited the most from farm seizures with some of them ending up with as many as six farms each against the government’s stated one-man-one-farm policy.

(Source)

President Mugabe’s young wife, Grace is at it again. First she grabbed Iron Mask Farm in Mazowe about 40km from Harare area in 2002 where she personally ordered John and Eva Matthews, both in their seventies, out of their 29-room house on the nearby 2,500-acre. Now, she is ordering a village to move for another project.

Grace, known for her extravagant lifestyle went about building an orphanage named Amitofo Care Centre- which is still to be completed. However, she has ordered the demolition of 100 homes close to the farm to accommodate the orphanage expansion.

The villagers have been issued with notices to leave the area as land has been promised for them elsewhere. Most of the affected people bought the residential stands as far back as 1998 and no compensation is being talked about. And local authority officials have been barred from commenting on the ‘sensitive issue”

At the weekend soldiers were seen patrolling the now heavily guarded area.

The orphanage was initially set to be officially opened in 2008 but was put on hold as construction was still underway.

“I had already finished building my house but she is forcing me out,” said a middle-aged woman, who requested anonymity for fear of victimisation. “She is making economic orphans to make way for other orphans” she said.

The council’s chief executive officer Liberty Mufandaedza would only say the affected ‘will soon be showing them where they will be relocated,”.

According to the orphanage plan, when complete it would consist of 30 five-bed houses. Each would accommodate 20 children under the care of two foster parents.

The centre to take up more than 48 hectares on completion will have a children’s home, a nursery and a school. A hospital, supermarket, restaurant and some guesthouses are on the plan and funds generated from the activities would assist in the upkeep of the orphans.

The Chinese Embassy and Chinese nationals based in Zimbabwe have offered to build a primary school at the farm.

(Source)

I. OVERVIEW

As Zimbabwe enters its second year under a unity government, the challenges to democratic transformation have come into sharp focus. Despite reasonable progress in restoring political and social stability, ending widespread repression and stabilising the economy since February 2009, major threats could still derail the reform process. In particular, resistance of intransigent and still powerful security sector leaders and fractious in-fighting between and within the Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU PF) and the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) must be addressed now. South Africa and other countries in southern Africa – who monitor the accord that guides the transition – must press the parties, and particularly President Robert Mugabe, to see the transition through to a successful conclusion. Donors should back their efforts.

The unity government, created under the Global Political Agreement (GPA) signed by Mugabe and MDC factional leaders Morgan Tsvangirai and Arthur Mutambara, was born under a cloud of scepticism. Most observers gave it little chance, predicting that, even as prime minister, Tsvangirai would fall prey to Mugabe’s “divide, rule, co-opt and destroy” strategy. Against the odds, the government started well: schools and hospitals re-opened; civil servants were paid and returned to work; the Zimbabwe dollar was shelved; goods returned to store shelves; and a cholera epidemic was controlled. Human rights activists reported a significant drop in abuses. Donors generally received well an ambitious yet pragmatic reconstruction programme calling for $8.5 billion in foreign aid and investment.

But major concerns undermining the transition process have come to the fore. Hardline generals and other Mugabe loyalists in ZANU PF are refusing to implement the government’s decisions, boycotting the new national security organ and showing public disdain for Tsvangirai. Farm seizures have continued virtually unabated. Most attention has focused on completing the GPA, but ZANU PF has delayed or ignored important commitments in that document, while stalling constitutional reforms by insisting on preserving broad executive privileges. Key blocked steps include a land audit, appointment of MDC governors, an end of arbitrary detentions and arrests, regular functioning of the National Security Council in place of the infamous Joint Operations Command, public consultations on a new constitution and preparation for elections.

These delays reflect the two deeper challenges on which this briefing concentrates. First, a mature political system must develop, so that ZANU PF and MDC engage as both competitors in the political arena and partners in the inclusive government. This will be difficult, especially under the divisive Mugabe, but other ZANU PF leaders, including the factions led by Vice President Joice Mujuru, and Defence Minister Emmerson Mnangagwa, know that their party has lost much popular support and needs a generational shift. For its part, the MDC must keep faith and engaged with its broad following in the transition process, including trade unions, human rights groups and women’s organisations. It must also show the country as a whole that it is a viable custodian of the state – competent, transparent, and capable of preserving social change since independence.

Equally challenging are security issues. A relatively small number of “securocrats” use their positions and symbiotic relationship with Mugabe to exercise veto power over the transition. They are motivated by differing factors: fear of losing power and its financial benefits, fear of prosecution for political or financial abuses, and a belief that they guard the liberation heritage against Tsvangirai and the MDC, which they view as fronts for white and Western interests. Zimbabweans across the political spectrum are quietly considering how to ease these officers into retirement, even at the cost of allowing them to keep their assets and providing them a degree of impunity from domestic prosecution, while simultaneously professionalising security forces respectful of human rights and a democratically elected government.

While the primary tasks ahead rest with Zimbabweans, the Southern African Development Community (SADC) must take seriously its GPA guarantor role. South African President Jacob Zuma’s activism as mediator must convey the message that the region will abide no alternative to the GPA. His recent actions, including appointment of three respected advisers to oversee the Zimbabwe account, are welcome indications he will be tougher vis-à-vis Mugabe on GPA obligations and respect for rule of law.

The broader international community, especially the UK, US, EU and China, should support and complement SADC’s efforts through careful calibration of trade, aid, and investment to encourage progress; maintenance of targeted sanctions on those thwarting the transition; and lifting of sanctions on entities key to economic recovery. Donors should provide new recovery and development assistance – including for rural development, health and education and strengthening of the judiciary, legislature and civil society – through transparent mechanisms, such as the Multi-Donor Trust Fund.

This briefing focuses on political party and security issues, as well as South Africa’s mediation. Subsequent reporting will analyse other topics vital to the transition, including constitutional and legal reform, justice and reconciliation, sanctions policies and security sector reform.

II. THE INCLUSIVE GOVERNMENT’S MIXED RECORD

Ten months after the violent and disputed 29 March 2008 elections that led to political stalemate with the long-time ruling ZANU PF party of President Mugabe, Morgan Tsvangirai’s wing of the opposition Movement for Democratic Change (MDC-T) announced it would enter the government alongside ZANU PF and the splinter MDC-Mutambara (MDC-M) faction. This followed an extraordinary summit of the Southern Africa Development Community (SADC) on 26 January 2009, whose final communiqué called for Tsvangirai to be sworn in as the prime minister by 11 February and the remainder of the government two days later.

The unity government was formed under the auspices of the Global Political Agreement (GPA), which had been hammered out with SADC assistance during lengthy negotiations. The GPA spelled out a specific continuing role for the regional mediators in monitoring and supporting its implementation. This was especially important, since most observers believed that the agreement was essentially unworkable, having established two centres of power within a single government but leaving most real political and military authority with Mugabe, his party and the hardline security establishment. Many considered that the African Union (AU), SADC, and the primary mediator, the then South African President Thabo Mbeki, had been too accommodating and respectful of Mugabe during the negotiation process. Additional concerns emerged after the GPA was signed, as Mugabe was allowed to ignore deadlines and otherwise repeatedly undermined the agreement without consequence.

Now into its second year, however, the inclusive government is making discernible, if slow and painful progress in a number of areas, bringing a degree of stability and predictability to a country that twelve months earlier was on the brink of collapse. Most notably, schools and hospitals have reopened, multi-million per cent inflation has come down to single digits, government revenue has begun to pick up and shops are fully stocked with food and other commodities.

Key Western donors have been slow to embrace the new government largely because of its failure to fully implement the GPA and their continuing antipathy toward Mugabe. For much of 2009, donors provided welcome expansion of humanitarian assistance, but generally adopted a wait-and-see posture on longer-term financial support for recovery and reconstruction. This risked thwarting the very changes the international community is seeking, both by weakening the hand of relative moderates in ZANU PF and more generally by undercutting popular support for the reform process. More recently, the US, UK and European Union (EU), among others, have expanded the definition of “humanitarian assistance” to cover many important social and economic sectors, such as agriculture, health, sanitation and education.

A. ECONOMIC REFORMS

Rebuilding a devastated economy with a 90 percent unemployment rate is a daunting challenge for the inclusive government. Finance Minister Tendai Biti has won praise for his steps to restore a degree of confidence and fiscal stability, but the prospects for rapid recovery are weak, not least because the fragile inclusive government and incomplete GPA have caused investors to shy away. Recently, government workers have gone on strike to demand a pay increase beyond the $160 monthly stipend they are generally now receiving, which they point out is insufficient to cover even basic costs of living in Harare and other urban centres.

Nevertheless, there are some signs of recovery. GDP grew 4.7 percent in 2009, the first positive totals in a decade. The 2010 budget aims for 7 percent GDP growth, underpinned by 10 percent growth in agriculture, as was already achieved the previous year, and 40 percent growth in mining. Since the Zimbabwe dollar was suspended and the US dollar and South African rand adopted as legal tender, inflation has fallen from an official 231 million percent in July 2008 to a 6 percent average in 2009 and is forecast at 5.1 percent in 2010. The International Monetary Fund extended $510 million to Zimbabwe as its share under an expansion of the Special Drawing Rights (SDR) facility that was authorised as a response to the global economic crisis. This has been earmarked for debt clearance, support of the budget and productive sectors, and water and sanitation, health and education needs.

The improved economy and donor pledges to cover half the $718 million required to cope with disease and hunger have been reflected in a lessening of the formerly dire humanitarian situation. Cholera, which had become rampant in late 2008, was brought under control in 2009, but there are warnings of a potentially new serious outbreak during the current rainy season.

B. POLITICAL REFORMS

Ultimately, the economy cannot be restored to health through technical measures alone. The political reforms envisaged in the GPA are needed. Helped by the regional re-engagement that resulted from the SADC Maputo summit in November 2009, there has been some gradual progress on implementation since the MDC-T briefly suspended participation in the unity government the previous month to protest ZANU-PF’s intransigence in discussions to move forward on GPA requirements.

Independent commissions have now been formed to address media, human rights and election issues. Notwithstanding statements to the contrary by senior ZANU-PF officials, a land audit may soon begin that would not just be a survey but rather an attempt to lay the groundwork for addressing this most sensitive reform area, including multiple farm ownership, production by new farmers, compensation for former white commercial farmers and an end to farm invasions. Arbitrary and politically motivated detentions and arrests have declined, though they have not ceased entirely, and the repressive Public Order Security and Access to Information and Protection of Privacy Acts (POSA and AIPPA) remain on the books.

The challenges of completing the GPA, crafting a new constitution and moving toward elections could yet cause the inclusive government to collapse. A number of issues are still outstanding in the protracted negotiations over GPA implementation. Indeed, the six on the original agenda have ballooned to 27, as the MDC-T, MDC-M and ZANU PF have brought in additional topics they considered had either been overlooked when the mediation began or had gained prominence during the course of the negotiations.

The negotiators have agreed to postpone to the end the especially contentious appointment of MDC-T’s Roy Bennett as deputy agriculture minister as well as the status of Mugabe stalwarts, Reserve Bank Governor Gideon Gono and Attorney General Johannes Tomana, whom the MDC believe were re-appointed to their positions unilaterally by Mugabe in violation of GPA provisions requiring consultations. Agreement has been reached on sharing provincial governors, though the dates of their appointments have not yet been determined. How the new National Security Council (NSC) is to function as a successor to the infamous Joint Operations Command (JOC) is still sharply contested.

Controversial matters introduced by the MDC-T and remaining open include security sector reform and compliance with the National Security Act, a framework for government operations (including procedures for chairing of the Cabinet when the president is not present) and rule of law topics such as freedom of assembly and association.

ZANU PF has put forward for consideration such issues as removal of sanctions, donor-funded parallel government structures, the role and funding of non-governmental organisations, selective funding of ministries and other entities by donors and the functions of the Multi-Donor Trust Fund, a basket fund coordinated by the international community to support the inclusive government.

The constitutional reform outreach programme intended to lead to a new constitution kicked off on 7 January 2010 but needs greater impetus. There is a growing recognition that this process cannot be the exclusive preserve of government and legislative committees, but rather must be a national exercise with full participation of civil society groups. This is especially essential for the MDC, since there are concerns that the party is losing contact with its popular base. Civil society activists and unions have complained, however, that the process is being driven by political elites for their own purposes, and some have even called for the international community to withdraw support for the transition until a credible consultation process has been adopted.

It is positive, nevertheless, that there is increasing acceptance across the political divide that the “Kariba Draft” – agreed by the inclusive government’s three parties under Mbeki’s mediation – cannot be the only reference for the new constitution, since it incorporates a number of potentially anti-democratic principles, most notably further enhancement of executive powers at the expense of legislative or judicial authority.

While many political figures believe a broadly acceptable compromise draft is likely by the end of the year, sharp differences remain between the parties. A blueprint written by ZANU PF strategists linked to the hardline camp around Emmerson Mnangagwa suggests that the party remains committed to an all-powerful presidency. While the 41-page document – a comparative analysis of ZANU PF and MDC-T constitutional positions – gives an insight into the long-time ruling party’s intention to preserve an authoritarian centralist government, the notion of an imperial presidency is not shared by the party wing around Vice President Joice Mujuru and her husband, ex-general, now prominent businessman Solomon Mujuru. The MDC-T wants executive authority to be shared between president, prime minister and Cabinet, with internal checks and balances within the executive.

ZANU PF – arguing that the past year has shown two centres of power are unworkable – supports a presidential system of government. The ZANU PF document states:

The experience of the people of Zimbabwe with the inclusive government since February 2009 has shown that sharing of executive power by the President and Prime Minister will result in… always a fight for power rather than progress. If there has to be a Prime Minister, he [should] not have executive authority. He is only a senior minister appointed and accountable to the President. In the SADC region, the prevalent arrangement is Head of State and leader of government.

Finally, preparations need to be made for presidential and parliamentary elections. There is much discussion of delaying these for several years, perhaps until 2013, so as to put electoral politics aside while the country copes with massive economic and social tasks. Many in Tsvangirai’s camp believe their party has not yet built a strong record in government and are equally concerned over how the military would react to a potential MDC-T victory.  Meanwhile, many ZANU PF stalwarts believe their party would be convincingly defeated, since recent polls indicate its support is now less than 20 percent.

Though it is still possible that Mugabe might dissolve the government in an attempt to catch the opposition off-guard with a rigged snap election as early as 2011, this seems unlikely at present, partly because of increased international scrutiny and engagement.

C. THREATS TO THE TRANSITION

Despite the current stalemate on outstanding GPA issues, there is some prospect that compromises can eventually be reached, though only with the help of intense mediation. However, security sector reform – firmly rejected by Mugabe – has emerged as a key challenge. Failure to initiate this process could unravel the inclusive government, prevent a smooth transition to the post-Mugabe era and raise real prospects of a coup, with accompanying instability that would affect the whole region. A dozen or so “securocrats” – senior military and intelligence figures – are widely considered to hold de facto veto power over any real transition. A cabal of powerful generals, with the support of elements in ZANU PF, still believes that Tsvangirai should not be permitted to lead the country, even if he wins an election. The MDC-T leadership has raised this implicit threat with SADC leaders. The issue is so sensitive that it was not addressed in the Mbeki-led GPA negotiations, but it has become a key agenda item for the new mediation team appointed by Jacob Zuma, his successor as South African president.

Moreover, even if the inclusive government completes the GPA, achieves a new democratic constitution and addresses the electoral process, the transition will not be assured unless a broader challenge is met, namely development of the political system to ensure that ZANU PF and the MDC-T balance political competition with cooperation in governance. This will be particularly difficult as long as the divisive Mugabe is at the helm. At the December 2009 ZANU PF congress, he retained his party presidency unchallenged for an additional five-year term, thus positioning himself to contest another national election.

III.  POLITICAL PARTY STRATEGIES

The three principal parties to the GPA went into the inclusive government with a stated objective of securing political stability, initiating economic recovery and holding fresh elections under a new constitution within eighteen months, that is, by March 2010.

While that date is no longer realistic, the government’s perceived successes and failures have emerged as the key battleground between the parties as they position themselves for an eventual electoral test.

ZANU PF – divided along factional lines on strategy, still seized with its Mugabe succession problem and battling to retain power that it has only reluctantly shared in the inclusive arrangement – comes close to unity only in its intent to frustrate reforms whose benefits would accrue primarily to the MDC-T. The MDC-T believes that success for the inclusive government in instituting political reforms and economic recovery would pave the way for it to win the right to form the next government after elections. MDC-M leaders, recognising their party lacks a solid base, are hedging their bets, seeking to keep the inclusive government functioning, while searching for an advantageous alliance ahead of a national vote.

A. ZANU PF’S DIVISIONS

1. The Mnangagwa camp’s hard line

ZANU PF’s overall objective in the inclusive government is to undercut any major political and economic reforms associated with the MDC-T and Prime Minister Tsvangirai. Under Emmerson Mnangagwa, the defence minister and presidential hopeful, and with the support of military leaders, ZANU PF’s participants in the unity government want to neutralise Tsvangirai and his party’s ministers, while taking advantage of the former opposition’s presence in government to push for the removal of targeted travel and related international sanctions on Mugabe and his party’s ministers.

This approach has Mugabe’s backing but, for reasons related to ZANU PF’s ongoing internal power struggle, not that of the Mujuru faction. Mnangagwa allies control the state bureaucracy, while Mujuru allies control what remains of grassroots support in those provinces the party dominates. Mugabe, conscious that neither faction commands overwhelming support within the party or sufficient national popularity to ascend to power on its own, plays them against each other in order to maintain his grip on the divided movement. While he has tended to side with Mnangagwa in dealings with the MDC-T, he has mostly favoured the Mujurus on internal ZANU PF decisions.

The attempt to frustrate the MDC-T includes at the national level:

• securing a five-year term for the inclusive government (to 2013), with Mugabe at the helm until then or he decides to retire, while making both it and the parliament dysfunctional; steps in this regard continue, including acts of lawlessness such as continued farm invasions, violations of property and investment rights, and resistance to political and economic reforms so as to discredit the MDC-T both nationally and internationally as an effective political force;

• retaining control of key state institutions and reducing Tsvangirai to a ceremonial prime minister, while discrediting, compromising and corrupting him and his party’s ministers;

• derailing the pace of the constitutional reform process; and

• inducing fears of a military coup should Tsvangirai win the election and attempt to take over from Mugabe.

The plan is executed at government level by ZANU PF permanent secretaries, whose appointments Tsvangirai accepted in the misguided belief that they would act as professional civil servants.

All these ZANU PF loyalists selected by Mugabe were first recommended by Misheck Sibanda, chief secretary to the Cabinet and a key Mnangagwa ally. In general, the permanent secretaries have taken advantage of the inexperience of MDC-T ministers to acquire free rein in determining the pace and implementation of government decisions and policies.

Permanent secretaries in education and public service ministries, for example, have in effect overturned decisions by their ministers with regard to new school fees structures and a manpower audit of the civil service, on whose payrolls ZANU PF has placed more than 20 000 youth militia members.

George Charamba, the influential permanent secretary in the information and publicity ministry, who doubles as Mugabe’s spokesperson, has denigrated the work of the government in which he serves, saying, “I am in the kitchen; there’s lots of smoke but hardly much cooking going on”.

This characterisation suits those in ZANU PF who fear that the electorate would credit successes primarily to Tsvangirai and the MDC-T.

Likewise, strategists aligned with Mnangagwa calculate, failures of the inclusive government are more likely to cast doubt on Tsvangirai’s capacity to provide effective national leadership.

Tsvangirai is also being prevented from demonstrating authority. He has not been able to chair a single Cabinet session, even though the GPA makes him deputy chairman of Cabinet as well as prime minister and leader of government business in Parliament. He should normally exercise the chair function in the president’s absence, but ZANU PF argues at the GPA negotiations that allowing him to do so would make the two vice presidents, Joice Mujuru and John Nkomo, redundant, causing further tension in the already fractious party.

Consequently, those senior ZANU PF members alternate in chairing the Cabinet when Mugabe is absent. On 25 January, Mugabe issued a written order for all ministers to report to the vice presidents and their permanent secretaries, not to Tsvangirai, on the execution of government business. While the order was subsequently withdrawn, the MDC-T considered it a blatant attempt to neuter the prime minister’s office.

In addition to frustrating the constitutional reform process so as to extend the lifespan of the inclusive government, a second strand of the strategy involves ensuring that parliament does not pass laws that would affect ZANU PF control of state institutions.  Even though the two MDC parties together constitute a small majority in the legislature, only eight bills have been passed in more than a year, two of which were meant to facilitate formation of the inclusive government, and the parliament has limited its work days due to inadequate funding.

While ZANU PF’s bloc has used parliamentary procedures to stall movement, this meagre legislative record is also partly the result of the MDC-T’s own failings (see below).

Mnangagwa supporters believe that despite its problems, the inclusive government could well limp on for a full term until 2013, with Mugabe at the helm, as the constituent parties have no better alternative. They consider that this would give their camp time to regroup from its failure to tilt the balance of power at the ZANU PF December 2009 congress, when it supported the unsuccessful candidacy of ZANU PF Women’s League chair Oppah Muchinguri to oust incumbent Vice President Joice Mujuru. They hope also that, after elections, they can dominate a new coalition government through alliance with MDC-M and perhaps even some MDC-T elements.

The Mnangagwa camp and its military allies, led by Defence Forces Commander General Constantine Chiwenga, was behind the resolution at the December congress instructing Mugabe to make no further concessions on outstanding GPA issues until the MDC-T provides satisfaction on a number of ZANU PF demands, including the removal of targeted Western sanctions against party leaders.

2. The Mujuru camp’s pragmatism

The Mujuru camp believes the successes the inclusive government has achieved and its ability to put a crimp in Mnangagwa’s presidential ambitions at the December congress have strengthened its chances to control the party and retain significant national power when Mugabe eventually retires or dies. Its dominance in the new politburo announced on 10 February 2010 by Mugabe confirmed that it is tightening its grip on the party leadership.

Mujuru supporters no longer call for Mugabe’s early exit, instead supporting him to stay until a moment of his own choosing. This shift results from a conclusion that he is too strong to be forced out at present and that his continued prominence provides cover for their largely behind-the-scenes manoeuvres to consolidate their position for the eventual showdown with Mnangagwa. Consequently, the Mujurus seek to promote further achievements for the inclusive government and building lines to Tsvangirai and the MDC-T that could eventually result in a coalition. They realise that it would be difficult in the immediate term for any ZANU PF candidate to beat Tsvangirai and the MDC-T in reasonably free and fair elections but conclude that Zimbabwe is likely to need an inclusive government for at least the next decade regardless of which party does best in a national vote.

This strategy requires Joice Mujuru, 54, to retain the country’s senior vice presidency, a position that gives her the inside track to ascend to the presidency if Mugabe retires or dies before the end of his term. The current constitution provides that in such a contingency the senior vice president acts as head of state for a 90-day period followed by elections. The GPA stipulates that ZANU PF would appoint a successor for the remainder of Mugabe’s term. Because of her seniority, that would also favour Joice Mujuru.

In either event, the Mujuru camp considers that an alliance with Tsvangirai would be necessary to solidify Joice’s position. She herself has privately told supporters she would have no problem working with Tsvangirai in the post-Mugabe period, though in public she talks tough about the MDC-T leader. A senior ally in the ZANU PF politiburo said, “she recognises Tsvangirai as an undeniable key player in Zimbabwe politics and in any future arrangement, hence strategic political relations are being cultivated across the party divide using the platform of the inclusive government”.

Cabinet ministers linked to the Mujurus have established a degree of confidential collaboration with their MDC-T counterparts and Tsvangirai to promote the reform agenda. This is still mainly preparatory and has not yet produced concrete legislative achievements, however, because the Mujurus rightly fear that to come into the open now would leave them vulnerable to criticism from the hawks within their own party.

The Mujuru camp advocates a constitution providing for an executive prime minister and a president with considerably less power than at present. Its assessment is that there will need to be a second inclusive government of some kind after Mugabe leaves the scene and that such a constitutional arrangement would be advantageous under the two likeliest scenarios – both of which acknowledge that it may have to be content with the junior role in a partnership with Tsvangirai and the MDC-T. If the Mujurus lose the internal party battle to Mnangagwa, they might throw their support behind MDC-T in the elections and Tsvangirai as a strong prime minister in exchange for the backing of Joice as a relatively weak president. Even if the Mujurus win control of ZANU PF, however, they doubt they could defeat Tsvangirai nationally, so the presidential post would be a reasonable second best in a political settlement to which they would bring their presumed ability to placate a critical mass of the military.

A close Mujuru adviser summed up: “Tsvangirai and MDC-T would be key in any future dispensation, and our political strategies are alive to that reality”.

3. Clan politics and the Mugabe succession – the “Zezuru mafia”

The December congress that retained Mugabe at the helm of the party for another five years appeared to confirm the view that the octogenarian wants to die in office rather than face an uncertain future in retirement. Barring any major midstream leadership changes, Mugabe, who turned 86 on 21 February 2010, now seems likely to stand for re-election. However, clan and regional fault lines that will influence the question of his eventual successor as party leader were also highlighted at the congress.

While Mugabe has kept his authority in the party in part by skilfully playing the Mujuru and Mnangagwa factions against each other, he has also relied heavily on the fact that the presidium – the party president, two vice presidents and the national chairman – is dominated by members of his Zezuru clan. He used that connection again in December 2009 to keep his position unassailable. In particular, the Zezuru line-up in both the presidium and politburo beat back relatively marginalised clans, mainly the Karangas led by Emmerson Mnangagwa, who believe it is their turn to have more power. A key consequence of this latest round of clan politics was, therefore, the strengthening of the Mujurus’ position vis-a-vis Mnangagwa.

The Zezuru dominance results from the 1980 division of Zimbabwe into ten provinces. Mashonaland (Zezuru) was cut up into four provinces: West, East, Central and Harare; Matebeleland (Ndebele) into three: North, South and Bulawayo; and Masvingo (Karanga) into only two, Masvingo and Midlands, while Manicaland (Manyika) remained undivided.

On any decision in ZANU PF, the Zezuru grouping, now headed by the Mujuru camp, has a virtual veto and needs only two other provinces to carry the day. Moreover, the strength of the Mashonaland East and Central vote for ZANU PF in past national elections has increased the leverage of the Zezurus generally and the Mujuru camp specifically.

The Karangas, who are 35 percent of the national population to the Zezurus’ 25 percent, received none of the top five party posts at the 2004 congress and were determined to do better in December 2009. By the eve of the congress, however, it was apparent they would fail. Basil Nyabadza resigned as party chairman for Manicaland in protest at what he described as a flawed nomination process and told Crisis Group: “Some leaders are like UN permanent Security Council members”, a reference to Mugabe’s rigid allocation of presidium positions based on the ZANU/ZAPU 1987 unity accord. While the congress’s rejection of the Karanga-Mnangagwa initiative and confirmation of Zezuru dominance within the party gave the Mujuru camp an edge in the succession struggle, it at the same time exacerbated clan tensions that risk erupting into conflict at the national level in the post-Mugabe era.

4. Tsholotsho II

Mnangagwa, 65, has the support of the ZANU PF leadership in Manicaland, Midlands, Masvingo and Matebeleland South, but these provinces have been MDC-T strongholds in recent elections. This suggests that he starts well behind in any three-way national contest against Tsvangirai and Joice Mujuru. He is a resilient politician, however. Despite a series of setbacks in the past ten years, he continues to marshal support and remains a serious contender for power. Having been thwarted in the campaign to bring down Joice Mujuru at the December congress, his camp is having more success in its current campaign, called Tsholotsho II,  to return key allies – suspended or marginalised in the aftermath of the 2004 congress defeat – to influence in party structures.

A Mnangagwa supporter in the ZANU PF politburo said, “we are creating our party within the main party – it’s one of the strategies which we are crafting to ready ourselves for the challenges ahead to win the presidency”.  Mnangagwa is also using his defence minister portfolio to strengthen ties to the security establishment, and his emissaries have even begun to explore possible alliances with Tsvangirai and the MDC-T, or at least some elements of that party.

Nothing is impossible in politics. There are no permanent friends or enemies. All options are open for consideration. Our Plan A is for our preferred candidate to ascend to power on his own. Our Plan B is to consider how we can forge an alliance with MDC-T and Tsvangirai, though this is still a remote possibility at this juncture.

B. MDC-T

1. Advancing the inclusive government

The MDC-T leadership believes that it will ultimately be judged by the electorate on its record in office. As a result, it has been focused over the past year on pushing implementation of the GPA and making the inclusive government functional. Thus, it has given relatively little attention to growing the party by building alliances and to shoring up its structures countrywide. Tsvangirai considers that a successful inclusive government would pave the way for the MDC-T to take responsibilities more firmly into its hands after fresh elections, since it can prove to sceptics that it is competent and can be entrusted with stewardship of the country. He told Crisis Group:

We are in this inclusive government to restore political and economic stability and give Zimbabwe hope for a better tomorrow and a chance for a fresh beginning, and we believe, besides the setbacks and frustration, we have managed to do that in the past year . . . Zimbabweans have seen a modest peace dividend and want more. Our challenge is to deliver on that front.

The decision to enter government was driven by a pragmatic assessment that Mugabe, ZANU PF hardliners and the security forces held a monopoly of force, were willing to use it against opponents and were favoured by Mbeki, the SADC mediator. The MDC-T calculated that in those circumstances, its capacity to effect change would be greater inside than outside government, and it believes that events are proving it correct.

The party is proudest of the inclusive government’s ability to overcome obstacles put up by the ZANU PF hardliners and its limited financial resources to record some impressive economic gains. Finance Minister Tendai Biti said the MDC-T had managed “to stop the bleeding and to bring sanity to the governance of economic affairs under very difficult circumstances… An economy works on the basis of predictability and trust, and what we have done in the past ten months is to bring predictability, consistency and therefore some legitimacy”.

Though Biti added that the recovery is fragile, and more donor support is needed to sustain the momentum for change and avoid a relapse, economic stability has caused Tsvangirai’s popularity to rise. A poll by the reputable Harare-based Mass Public Opinion Institute (MPOI) in September found that 57 percent would vote for Tsvangirai, 10 percent for Mugabe in new elections.

Tsvangirai believes that the international community should reward progress by extending aid for reconstruction and development. “There is no dispute in everyone’s assessment that there is, indeed, progress being made in Zimbabwe, and how do you reward that progress? By moving away from just humanitarian aid to economic growth, development aid and ensuring that any existing restrictions are removed”.

Attempting to walk a tightrope with its ZANU PF partners in the inclusive government, the MDC-T wants the lifting of “non-personal sanctions” – those impacting government entities vital to economic recovery, such as the Agricultural Bank of Zimbabwe – but targeted measures retained on individuals who continue to block meaningful political reforms.

Tsvangirai has written to EU leaders, including UK Prime Minister Gordon Brown, urging a general review of restrictive measures, while Biti requested the EU to free eight government companies from its sanctions. On 15 February, the EU responded by renewing the sanctions regime for a year, while dropping nine companies from the list.

2. The Tsvangirai/Mujuru axis

The MDC-T originally anticipated that the inclusive government would last at most two years, during which rapid political and economic reforms would be followed by fresh elections. This expectation has been modified by political realities, and a senior Tsvangirai aide summed up the frustration: “You really wonder whether Mugabe is in charge. Maybe we should have directly negotiated with the military during the mediation, because they appear to be the ones calling the shots”.

Tsvangirai has suggested publicly that an early election might be necessary to break the impasse, but this appears to be a tactic to put pressure on ZANU PF. He realises that more time is required to democratise state institutions and put a new constitution in place, so the MDC-T may be prepared to stay in uneasy harness with ZANU PF in the inclusive government for a full five-year term.

Tsvangirai and his team are consequently taking a two-pronged approach, pushing for incremental gains on political reforms through the negotiation process, while seeking to take full charge of the economy through Biti’s finance ministry. Jameson Timba, the MDC-T deputy information and publicity minister, told Crisis Group:

We have ring-fenced the ZANU PF economic tsar, Reserve Bank Governor Gideon Gono, and our minister, Biti, is in control. On that front, we have made huge strides because the treasury has reclaimed its power, which was not the case before. Now we are going to pitch the fight to expedite political reforms.

Party strategists worry that if the inclusive government collapses before meaningful political reforms are implemented, elections would be held under the current constitution in an even more hostile environment conducive to ZANU PF rigging than March 2008.

ZANU-PF hawks are mainly responsible for frustrating reforms, but the MDC-T shares blame for failing to lead in parliament, where it has not used the speakership and its plurality to initiate progressive legislation to open political space. It has not moved aggressively, for example, against restrictive laws like AIPPA and POSA. The MDC-M leadership has threatened its legislators with party expulsion if they get too close to the Tsvangirai wing of the once unified movement, and, as noted above, the Mujuru camp of ZANU-PF is not yet prepared to cooperate openly. But some MDC-T leaders in government and parliament appear satisfied with the temporary arrangement and the accompanying perks it provides. There are also allegations, as yet unproven, of corruption involving ministers and local councils the party controls.

The MDC-T constitutional proposal – an executive prime minister and a weaker president – is similar to what the Mujuru camp supports, and Tsvangirai, like Joice Mujuru, has privately indicated to confidantes a willingness to work together. However, Tsvangirai seeks to maximise his leverage by keeping options open, since both ZANU PF factions are privately reaching out to him about possible post-Mugabe alliances.

MDC-T insiders told Crisis Group the past year has convinced Tsvangirai he would still need to work with some ZANU PF elements after an electoral victory “to complete the transition and neutralise hawks in ZANU PF and some elements in the securocrats who still control most key institutions”.

A close adviser said, “we would need to form a second inclusive government with some elements in ZANU PF out of our own magnanimity to complete the transition and soft-land the crisis, even if we were to win outright in the next election”.

But worry about a military coup explains much of the MDC-T leadership’s interest in exploring a second inclusive government, in particular with the Mujuru camp, which commands loyalty from some influential generals.

C. MDC-M

The MDC-M faction, which has ten members of parliament, exercises limited influence and recognises that its very survival is heavily dependent on the durability of the inclusive government. While publicly stating that an early election would favour ZANU PF, its leader, Deputy Prime Minister Arthur Mutambara, acknowledges that he needs the full five-year term to raise his political standing and give the splinter party time to forge new alliances that might allow it to stay relevant in the post-Mugabe era. Mutambara’s claim that he and the party play a critical unifying role in the GPA and keeping the government functional despite Mugabe’s and Tsvangirai’s often tense relationship is less than fully persuasive in view of their unhelpful role in parliament.

Without solid grassroots support, it is most likely that the MDC-M will eventually collapse, with some leaders rejoining the larger MDC-T, a revived ZAPU  or ZANU PF, depending on which faction gains control of the old ruling party. Industry and Commerce Minster Welshman Ncube, the MDC-M power broker, would favour collaboration and an inclusive government pact with the Mnangagwa camp.

IV. THE SECUROCRAT PROBLEM

A. OPPOSITION TO THE TRANSITION PROCESS AND HINTS OF A COUP

After almost a year in the inclusive government, senior MDC-T officials told Crisis Group that they believe the greatest threat to the power-sharing coalition and to the country’s stability will come from leaders of the national security services who are refusing to accept the new dispensation. One said:

We can implement the GPA to the last line, but if we don’t deal with the contentious issue of the security leadership in this country, we will be haunted by it at the next elections. We will have a Madagascar-like situation if the military is left with free rein to dictate and influence key decisions with regards to political developments in the country, including national leadership.

In private discussions in South Africa, Tsvangirai and other senior MDC-T officials highlighted the issue of “phased security sector reform” as his principal concern in the run-up to new elections.

Most observers believe that up to 20 high-ranking security officials (the “securocrats”) maintain a de facto veto over the transition process. Among those frequently cited as hardliners are Defence Forces Commander General Constantine Chiwenga, Police Commissioner Augustine Chihuri and Central Intelligence Organisation Deputy Director General Maynard Muzariri.

In hushed conversations, MDC-T officials and civil society activists express fears that a coup could come shortly after an MDC-T electoral victory or should Mugabe die in office. Mugabe has fully backed the military leadership, his last remaining line of loyal support given his fractious party, in part by ruling out attempts to carry out a security reform programme. He left no doubts about this symbiotic relationship in his closing remarks to the ZANU PF congress on 19 December 2009:

ZANU PF as the party of the revolution and the people’s vanguard shall not allow the security forces of Zimbabwe to be the subject of any negotiations for the so-called security sector reforms… That is the most dependable force we could ever have, it shall not be tampered with”.

The issue of the military command was not specifically addressed in the GPA negotiations. Still, the parties agreed to establish a new coordinating body for defence and security policy, the National Security Council (NSC), that would include Tsvangirai and his two deputy prime ministers and replace the ZANU PF-dominated, secretive and abusive Joint Operations Command (JOC).

Over the past decade, the JOC has been behind the strategy of repression to keep Mugabe and ZANU PF in power. It is the instrument through which Mugabe has masterminded the rigging of elections and the continuing wave of violent farm seizures. The fact that the NSC has met only once in the past year while the supposedly defunct JOC holds numerous weekly sessions with no MDC-T participation is deeply worrying. Most recently, the JOC was reportedly behind the January decision by the ZANU PF politburo to make no further concessions to implement the GPA until sanctions are lifted.

A number of generals are now contemplating moving into full-time politics in ZANU PF, including Chiwenga, who is eyeing a leadership position in the party’s campaign in the new elections. This pattern underlines their determination to remain at the centre of national political and economic life.

B. “SOFT LANDING” CONSIDERATIONS

The motives driving the senior security leaders to undermine the transition process and the inclusive government are diverse. In the past, they have reportedly benefited from packages administered by Reserve Bank Governor Gono through so-called “quasi-fiscal measures”, as well as largesse channelled through Mugabe’s wife, Grace, and Chiwenga.

A number of generals have reportedly built up substantial landholdings, either personally or through family members and other proxies, as a result of farm seizures ostensibly designed to assist the rural poor. Their desire to protect these holdings is a key reason ZANU PF is opposing implementation of the GPA requirement to conduct a comprehensive land audit, since that exercise would expose these ownership patterns. Mugabe is reportedly still sustaining the livelihoods and patronage network of a small group of generals, mainly through proceeds from the controversial private sale of diamonds being mined in abusive conditions from the Marange fields in eastern Zimbabwe and through loans extended to the military by the Chinese government.

Some senior security officials fear prosecution for gross human rights abuses committed in recent repression campaigns, especially those associated with the 2008 presidential and parliamentary elections, as well as decades-old abuses, such as the killing of over 20,000 mainly Ndebele-speaking people in Matebeleland in the 1980s in a campaign known as Gukurahundi. Amnesties have been granted frequently in the post-independence period, including in 1980, 1985, 1988, 1990, 1995 and 2000. The amnesty provision in 1990 provided a full pardon for security force members for any offense committed during “anti-dissident” operations “if that offence was committed in good faith for the purpose of or in connection with the restoration or maintenance of good order and public safety in Zimbabwe”.

Still, a number of senior security officials have quietly expressed concerns that such amnesties could be revoked under an MDC-controlled government and legislature and that these provisions do not afford protection from international prosecution.

Others generals are motivated by a continuing sense of ideological fervour, viewing their acts of repression against “dissidents” and white farmers over the past three decades as simply a continuation of the liberation struggle of the pre-independence period. In the extreme, they believe that Tsvangirai and the MDC-T are mere puppets for white farmers and business interests, as well as foreign interests, especially British. They see themselves as the bulwark and Praetorian Guard of the revolutionary struggle, and thus handing over power to Tsvangirai, who has no liberation war record, would amount to selling out. One implication of this attitude is that these security officials would be loath to appear before anything resembling a truth and reconciliation commission and acknowledge their abuses, since they believe that their acts were not crimes but heroic feats to protect Zimbabwe from its enemies.

Zimbabweans across the political spectrum are increasingly debating the question of how to secure the retirement of these security officials during the life of the inclusive government. Many are highly reluctant to consider any concessions to the officials, viewing them as rewards for past abuses and undercutting rule of law in a future Zimbabwe. While even these individuals see the threat from the generals, they also believe that the threat can be minimised by playing on the growing divisions between senior security officials and the rank-and-file military and police, who have themselves suffered under the economic implosion brought about by Mugabe and his cronies. Further, they doubt that concessions would have the desired effect, given the varied motivations of the generals and their scepticism regarding the permanence and utility of past amnesties.

Some suggest that security sector reform, leading to higher salaries, improved housing and educational benefits and a greater sense of pride in a professional security service, would better undercut the capacity of senior officers to use troops against a democratically-elected government.

Expanded international pressure on Mugabe and ZANU PF to ensure the full functioning of the National Security Council, truly disband the Joint Operations Centre and proceed with the land audit to settle issues of ownership and compensation, if necessary, would go a long way toward diminishing the threat of the security officials.

At the same time, a number of MDC-T and MDC-M officials and human rights activists, including some who have suffered the worst of the abuses, have raised the possibility of arranging “soft landings” for the securocrats.

Persuading them to retire peacefully will not be easy, given their fears of the post-Mugabe era. Among the ideas being discussed is a new domestic amnesty for acts committed since the last amnesty in 2000, in exchange for the retirement of the officials, but revocable should they be found to be engaging in actions to thwart the transition to democratic governance. In keeping with past Zimbabwean practice, such an amnesty would not apply to so-called “specified offences”, such as murder, rape and theft of public property, nor would it protect the officials from international prosecution for crimes against humanity, war crimes and genocide.

Another idea being discussed is to allow the generals to keep their assets, including perhaps even their farmlands, by arranging legal transfer to them as retirement compensation, but also providing compensation to those illegally dispossessed. The US, EU and others could sweeten the deal by removing targeted sanctions on those who comply with its terms, since they would no longer be thwarting the transition.

It is unclear whether these measures, even in combination, would be sufficient to remove the threat posed by many of the incumbent leaders of the security forces. Having always associated the exercise of power with the use of force, they may never be satisfied that their economic interest and personal security could be adequately protected after they surrender their power.

V. THE ROLE OF SOUTH AFRICA AND SADC

Zimbabwe’s economic implosion and Mugabe’s increasingly authoritarian rule have had wide regional implications. The country traditionally was Southern Africa’s bread-basket, and its relatively modern infrastructure, extensive mining and manufacturing sectors, prosperous tourism and well-trained labour force helped anchor the region. With the end of apartheid in the early 1990s, many envisaged South Africa and Zimbabwe driving a broad regional market, complete with extensive energy and transport links. Instead, Harare has become a regional crisis and embarrassment. Up to four million Zimbabweans – roughly a third of the population – have flooded across national borders due to political repression and absence of economic opportunities, affecting the stability of particularly South Africa and prompting xenophobic attacks by those fearing loss of jobs or a drain on social spending.

Similarly, South African business grew deeply concerned over the collapse of Zimbabwe’s mining, manufacturing, tourism and agriculture sectors and infrastructure, in all of which it has major investments.

A month after the failed March 2008 elections and acting on behalf of SADC and the African Union, Thabo Mbeki launched the mediation that produced the GPA in September of that year. As described above, this mediation remains essential, because of the difficulties that immediately developed with GPA implementation and the operations of the inclusive government. Facing a political crisis at home that eventually led to his resignation as president, Mbeki did little further, but the advent of Jacob Zuma as his successor has changed the situation. While Zuma carefully refrained from challenging Mugabe or the new SADC president, the Congo’s Joseph Kabila, during the early September 2009 Kinshasa summit, he has subsequently displayed a refreshing engagement and toughness on the Zimbabwe account.

In a clear break with the Mbeki team, Zuma appointed three of his most trusted and powerful advisers – international relations specialist Lindiwe Zulu, anti-apartheid veteran Mac Maharaj and former cabinet minister Charles Nqaqula – as his point-persons for the mediation process. Significantly, at SADC’s special summit on Zimbabwe in Maputo in November 2009, following the MDC-T’s suspension of its participation in the inclusive government, Zuma was reportedly firmer with Mugabe than anyone had been during the lengthy crisis, reaffirming that there was no alternative to the GPA and that a tough response would be forthcoming against any party that derailed it. “He told the three principals, including Mugabe, that with him at the helm of the mediation, it was no longer business as usual”.

There is growing impatience among the South Africans with the slow pace of reform. Though it looks improbable, the mediation team indicates that all main outstanding issues should be resolved before June, when the football World Cup begins in South Africa: “We don’t want trouble in our backyard, especially this year when we host the World Cup, and our mediation team will work hard to ensure that key issues are out of the way before mid-year”.  The South African intelligence leadership has reinforced this message with all principals in the inclusive government,  and Zuma has publicly urged the three political parties in the power-sharing arrangement to resolve remaining issues in time for elections in 2011.

The Zuma team considers that ZANU PF and MDC-T have both been guilty of adding peripheral items to the negotiating agenda. Zuma has called on the principals to be more flexible and “park” a number of topics for the time being to allow progress.

A senior ANC executive member told Crisis Group:

The heart of the crisis in Zimbabwe centres around security issues which have closed political space and yielded disputed election outcomes for the past ten years. That’s what should consume our time in the mediation process. Getting Reserve Bank Governor Gono out today or arguing about the prime minister’s residence is not going to result in a free and fair election and a smooth transition”.

Zuma’s mediation also includes an effort to deal with the securocrat problem. A selected group of retired generals from South Africa and other SADC countries are to hold discussions with senior Zimbabwean officers about the role of the military in a civilian-led government. At the same time, Pretoria is working on issues related to a possible amnesty or other forms of immunity for the current security leadership in the post-Mugabe era. A senior official in the African National Congress (ANC), South Africa’s ruling party, explained:

The way the security leadership in Zimbabwe is handled is crucial to how a smooth transition process can be achieved. Our mediation process, as well as the main parties to the negotiations, cannot turn a blind eye to that critical element given Zimbabwe history. We can complete all the elements as outlined in the GPA, but if we don’t work on and begin to engage that sensitive issue now, it could create great instability and roll back all the gains which we would have achieved. We are very aware that is the crux of the matter, and we are exploring ways to delicately engage on this sensitive issue.

In order to influence the emerging power dynamics in Zimbabwe, the Zuma administration has also deepened its relations with Tsvangirai and the MDC-T, while privately urging ZANU PF to consolidate and clarify its own party succession plan.

A member of the ANC executive told Crisis Group that because his party was doubtful there would be a smooth political settlement after another round of elections or a Mugabe exit, it was drawing on its experience in ending apartheid to encourage a private dialogue between moderates in ZANU PF and the MDC-T with a view to building support for a coalition government after the polls regardless of who wins.

SADC as an organisation has continued to defer to South Africa on Zimbabwe policy, while calling for strict adherence to the GPA, continued negotiations on outstanding issues, new foreign assistance and investment and a lifting of Western sanctions. Many in Zimbabwe believe that only Zuma, among current southern African leaders, has the mix of political stature and revolutionary credentials to take a tough, effective line with Mugabe. While Mugabe is reportedly surprised and angered at his treatment by Zuma, recent progress, though slow and inconsistent, suggests the approach can work. Aware of the impact of Zimbabwe’s continuing crisis on his own country’s economic and social conditions, there are strong reasons for the South African president to remain engaged once the World Cup is over and indeed to adopt the even more assertive approach to the mediation and the parties that may be necessary to resolve the crisis.

VI. CONCLUSION

Zimbabwe remains at risk from the long legacy of misgovernment that produced the interlocking political, economic and humanitarian crises of the past decade. In addition to the challenges of governance and security highlighted in this briefing, any of a wide range of problems, singly or in common, could return it to the edge of collapse, particularly as long as Robert Mugabe remains head of state and his long-time ruling ZANU PF party maintains its intransigent stance.

The reformist MDC, split into sharply opposed factions, has performed reasonably in government, but has not seized the impetus for reform that seemed possible after it gained a parliamentary majority in 2008.

But despite its internal contradictions, the widely divergent ambitions of its three participating parties and the reluctance of donors to fully embrace it, the unity government has important achievements to its credit. The economy has gained a degree of stability, arbitrary political violence has been reduced, and a dialogue continues, with South African mediation, on the major political, constitutional and electoral issues. Even a bitterly divided ZANU PF implicitly acknowledges the need for a generational change, and at least one of its two main contenders for Mugabe’s mantle is well into exploration of ways to come to terms with the main MDC wing and the transition process.

South Africa’s role remains vital, especially now that Jacob Zuma is bringing to it a more even-handed and energetic quality of engagement.

Western governments need to offer complementary financial as well as political assistance, including the maintenance of targeted sanctions on the spoilers and the selective removal of corporate sanctions that stand in the way of economic growth.

Above all, Zimbabweans themselves – both the parties in the inclusive government and broader civil society – must put the legacy of “divide-and-rule” politics behind them and learn basic lessons of cooperation essential for a successful democratic transition.

(Source)

The embattled South African president Jacob Zuma has failed to persuade Gordon Brown to lighten sanctions on Zimbabwe on his state visit to Britain.

South African president Jacob Zuma has failed to persuade Gordon Brown to lighten sanctions on Zimbabwe on his state visit to Britain.

Mr Zuma hit back by refusing to withdraw previous comments about Britain’s “colonial” attitude to his polygamous lifestyle.

The pair addressed journalists in Downing Street after meeting for breakfast talks, as Mr Zuma’s three-day state visit as a guest of the Queen drew to a close.

After reaching agreement on climate change, nuclear non-proliferation and the importance of the World Cup in reducing poverty in South Africa, the two leaders struggled to find consensus on the EU’s sanctions against Zimbabwe.

Mr Zuma, along with other regional leaders, wants to persuade the EU to reduce the sanctions.

“We are agreed we should all put our heads together to put a solution to Zimbabwe,” he said.

But the British government remains steadfastly behind the sanctions, which it argues are targeted at individuals who are responsible for violence and businesses linked to them.

“We applaud the efforts of President Zuma to bring stability and change to Zimbabwe,” the prime minister said.

“We, however, must be absolutely sure that progress is being made… We must be moving from what is a unity and transitional government to free and fair elections. There can be no excuses for delay.”

Mr Zuma responded: “We are very positive that as we work harder we will certainly be able to make the position clear.

“There has been a greater understanding of what we are trying to do in Zimbabwe and we are moving closer.”

The South African president has received criticism from some sections of the British press for his polygamy. His third and newest wife accompanied him on his trip.

“Who gave authority to others to judge others?” he asked, before adding: “We’re not trying to condemn the British, or whatever.

“I’m sure you know that the colonial life by Africans has been viewed by Africans in a very particular way. I’m sure we’re making a comment in that particular way.”

(Source)

Zimbabwe’s unity government is reviewing rules forcing foreign-owned firms to sell a majority stake to locals, a cabinet minister said on Wednesday, adding that the regulations were published prematurely last month.

The regulations came into effect on Monday and give foreign-owned companies, including banks and mines, 45 days to submit proposals on how they plan to sell 51 percent of their shares to black Zimbabweans within the next five years.

Last week, Deputy Prime Minister Professor Arthur Mutambara said only Youth, Indiginisation and Empowerment Minister Saviour Kasukuwere was qualified to give public statements about the ZANU PF rogue foreign assets looting scheme.

“Those regulations were published prematurely,” Welshman Ncube, Industry and Commerce Minister told business executives.

He said the rules had not been submitted to a cabinet committee for debate on their legality and whether they were consistent with government policy. The committee would then make recommendations to the government.

“That did not take place. It is now taking place and all the ministers will be asked to make contributions,” Ncube said.

(Source)

Zimbabwe, when I was growing up there, was the breadbasket of Africa and had one of the best education systems in Africa if not the world.

The healthcare system was great, too.

For a child born in apartheid-era South Africa, as I was, it was a land of opportunity. After my mother moved to Rhodesia, I received a first-class education, and graduated from university in post-independence Zimbabwe.

It is startling how quickly a society can fall apart.

My film, Zimbabwe’s Forgotten Children, follows the stories of a number of children struggling to survive in the country today.

Zimbabwe has become a very hard place to be poor, and poverty is ugly. Conspicuous consumerism is very evident, and greed is also very visible.

I shot the film undercover, after getting a permit to make another film, about my childhood and how it has shaped me.

I was raised as a child of the ZANU party. My stepfather’s cousin Nabaningi Sithole, founder of ZANU, was a prominent politician, and my cousin Edison Sithole the first doctor of law in southern and central Africa – he disappeared in 1975, abducted by Ian Smith because he was a human rights lawyer and political activist.

But while I was making this film the Zimbabwean government launched Operation Murambatsvina (Remove the filth) – a slum clearance programme that left thousands of people on the streets.

This made me resolute to make another film, about Zimbabwe’s children.

I focus mostly on three stories.

There are Michelle and Grace, who live with their father Joseph. Joseph dreams of saving enough money to pay for his children’s education, but for now they all work – by digging bones from a rubbish heap and selling them.

“What I am doing is child abuse really,” he says. “They should not be working like this. It hurts me.”

There is Esther, who looks after her mother as she dies of Aids, and also her younger brother, Tino.

After her mother dies, Esther’s life becomes simpler. “It’s much easier to look after Tino now, because I don’t have to look after mum as well,” she says.

Esther’s case is not an unusual one in today’s Zimbabwe. It’s a common scenario.

There are also the street children.

When I lived in Zimbabwe in my twenties, there were hardly any street children in Harare.

Children are now not only living on the streets, they are giving birth on the streets. A second generation of street children is growing up.

The system was supposed to take care of its people, but it has failed.

In less than a generation, the country has changed beyond all recognition.

Xoliswa Sithole is a South African film-maker based in Johannesburg. She was awarded a BAFTA, for her role in producing the BBC/True Vision documentary Orphans of Nkandla, chronicling the effects of Aids in Africa. Zimbabwe’s Forgotten Children can be seen BBC Four, at 2245 on Wednesday 3 March, or on the BBC iPlayer.

(Source)

More than 100 political activists packed into a village hall to discuss the future of Zimbabwe.

The conference, in Quorn, was to find a democratic way of overthrowing Zimbabwean dictator Robert Mugabe.

Despite its rural location, it proved so popular that organisers had to turn people away at the doors.

Members of the opposition Zimbabwe African People’s Union (ZAPU) met at the unlikely venue on Saturday afternoon for the general meeting of the European branch of their party.

The activists spent the afternoon listening to lectures on how the country could move forward, and discussing how its different tribes could work together to create a fair and democratic government.

Provincial vice-chairman Nkosana Mthimkhulu, who lives in Birstall, said: “It was a very successful day.”

He said local people had been surprised at the choice of Quorn for the meeting but it had the “right atmosphere”.

“Zimbabwe has a lot of quiet villages, they are where many people live.”

Addressing an inter-branch leadership meeting at a packed Lobengula Hall in Bulawayo on Saturday, February 20, Dabengwa said ZAPU was Zimbabwe’s last hope.

He said people look up to the country’s mother party, ZAPU to pick up the pieces and steer the country back to prosperity.

“I was in Murewa and people there told me that they have also been affected by Gukurahundi like the people of Matabeleland through ZANU PF’s violence.

ZAPU is now everywhere, even in President Mugabe’s home province Mashonaland West. All of the territory from Karoi to Plumtree was a ZIPRA front during the war and the people want their party like never before,” he said.

Dabengwa warned that the opportunity could be lost if ZAPU supporters allowed themselves to be diverted by spoilers.

“ZANU PF thought that they would not worry about ZAPU outside Matabeleland and they are now discovering that they were wrong.

The MDC thought Matabeleland was their stronghold but have since discovered how much they fooled themselves and are panicking and resorting to trying to hijack the people of Matabeleland’s Zambezi Water Project,” said the former ZIPRA military intelligence supremo.

(Source)